Fixed versus Flexible Election Cycles: Explaining innovation in the timing of Canada’s Election Cycle by Ferris, J.S. (J. Stephen) & Olmstead, D.E.H. (Derek E.H.)
 
 
 
 
 
CEP 12-04 
 
 
Fixed versus Flexible Election Cycles:  Explaining 
innovation in the timing of Canada’s Election Cycle 
 
 
J. Stephen Ferris and Derek E. H. Olmstead 
Carleton University 
 
July 2013; revised 1 December 2016 
 
 
CARLETON ECONOMIC PAPERS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of Economics 
 
1125 Colonel By Drive 
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada 
K1S 5B6 
 
 
 
 
 
Fixed versus Flexible Election Cycles:  Explaining innovation in the timing 
of Canada’s Election Cycle* 
 
 
 
J. Stephen Ferris 
steve.ferris@carleton.ca  
(corresponding author) 
 
and 
 
Derek E. H. Olmstead 
Derek.Olmstead@carleton.ca 
 
Third Draft, December 1 2016 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper argues that there is an efficiency gain underlying the recent adoption of legislation calling for a 
fixed four-year governing term by the federal and most provincial governments in Canada. The efficiency 
gain arises from foreclosing an externality produced by the constitutional provision that sets a maximum 
length for a legislative term (five years) while allowing the governing party (through the Governor General) 
to dissolve the House early. Because the opportunistic use of surprise can improve the governing party’s 
probability of winning, strategic choice can lead to elections being held at times that most disadvantage the 
incumbent’s rivals. Evidence from Canada is introduced suggesting that federal elections became less 
predictable through successive reductions in the campaign time given to competitors, thus raising the cost 
of this externality. The same reasoning suggests that the party most likely to propose this legislative 
innovation will be the party in opposition rather than in power and/or the new leader of an established party 
facing loss in the upcoming election. By fulfilling the fixed term even when it could benefit by calling the 
election early, the party establishes a precedent that raises the political cost to others of cancelling the fixed 
term legislation.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In Canada, as in other countries with parliamentary systems of government, there has been a 
recent trend for the governing political party to surrender its right to choose the timing of the 
next election in favour of a system that permanently fixes the next election date and thus the 
length of future governing tenures.1 Beginning with British Columbia in 2001, nine of ten 
provincial governments (Nova Scotia being the sole exception), two territorial governments and 
the federal government have all enacted legislation adopting a fixed four year term.2  Whether or 
not the election term is truly fixed, however, is currently ambiguous.  Using the case of federal 
legislation as representative, An Act to Amend the Canada Elections Act (Bill C-16) was passed 
in 2007 by the Conservative Party government requiring that “[s]ubject to an earlier dissolution 
of Parliament, a general election must be held on the third Monday in October in the fourth 
calendar year following a previous general election, with the first general election to be held on 
Monday, October 19, 2009”.3 This declaration of a fixed election date, however, was 
immediately followed by a clause stating that "[n]othing in this section affects the powers of the 
Governor General, including the power to dissolve Parliament at the Governor General's 
discretion." Exactly how legislation that fixes governing duration can be reconciled with a 
constitution that requires the governing party to maintain the confidence of the House of 
Commons (House) poses a challenging accountability versus stability trade-off for political 
                                                 
1 Other countries that have adopted fixed terms recently include South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland and 
the United Kingdom. 
2 All jurisdictions in Canada have picked a recurring four-year election cycle, with most dated to take place 
sometime in the fall. The exceptions are British Columbia with a fixed date set in May while Alberta has a three 
month window between March 1 and May 31.  See the Data Appendix for greater political detail. 
3 Provincial legislation is often more explicit.  For example, Section 23 of British Columbia’s Constitution Act 
reads: (1) The Lieutenant Governor may, by proclamation in Her Majesty's name, prorogue or dissolve the 
Legislative Assembly when the Lieutenant Governor sees fit. (2) Subject to subsection (1), a general voting day 
must occur on May 17, 2005 and thereafter on the second Tuesday in May in the fourth calendar year following the 
general voting day for the most recently held general election. 
2 
 
theorists and ultimately for the courts.4  Nevertheless in current practice, the enacted legislation 
has circumvented inconsistency through general agreement on the primacy of the principle that 
the governing party can continue to term only with the confidence of the House (implicitly 
making the concept of a fixed term applicable only to majority governments).  Taking this to 
mean that the fundamental system of representative parliamentary government remains 
unaltered, this paper is concerned with the narrower question of why a majority government in a 
Westminster parliamentary system would ever choose to give up the right to pick the most 
opportune moment to call the next election.5 
The reason this question is of interest is that a large number of studies have shown that 
governing parties in Westminster parliamentary systems behave as if the right to choose the 
timing of the next election has strategic value [Smith (1996, 2003), Kayser (2005), Roy and 
Alcantara (2012), Dickson, Farnworth and Zhang (2013)].  By showing that historically the 
dating of federal elections in Canada has responded to the peaking of the business cycle, Voia 
and Ferris (2013) show that federal political practice is consistent with the strategic choice of an 
appropriate re-election date rather than waiting out the full term. Even when the governing party 
has a minority position in the House, and so can continue to govern only with the cooperation of 
other parties, the ability to prorogue parliament in combination with its ability to initiate an 
election call gives the Prime Minister and his/her party additional electoral flexibility over their 
                                                 
4 Because the minority Conservative Party that formed the government passing this bill chose twice to dissolve the 
House before the end of the designated four year term, it is currently unclear whether or not the Act has effectively 
fixed governing durations.  However in its third term the Conservative Party did establish the precedent for majority 
federal governments, upholding the scheduled four year term despite encountering economic turbulence that might 
otherwise have led to an early election call. Whether the current majority Liberal government chooses to retain that 
legislation or enact its own preferred preferential voting legislation remains to be seen. See also Tremblay 
(2008/2009) and Stoltz (2010). 
5 While a number of provincial governing parties have called elections earlier than the projected fixed election date, 
none have continued governing past the set date (that is shorter than the constitutional limit of five years). 
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rivals.  Hence it seems counter-intuitive for the governing party to surrender voluntarily such an 
advantage. 
In general there are two types of reasons why such an institutional innovation such as the 
adoption of a fixed term would be adopted.  The first is that a fixed election term could generate 
efficiency gains relative to discretion.  Many have argued, for example, that a fixed governing 
term provides greater election predictability and hence organizational and operational benefits 
that lower election costs and make the process more efficient for both voters and competing 
political parties (see, for example, Hazell, 2010, p. 10).  In such a case the governing party would 
have an incentive to adopt the superior rule if it could benefit from doing so electorally.  
However to explain why this is happening now, a reason is needed for why the net benefit of 
having a fixed term has recently become more valuable. 
For an economist, the adoption of a rule that fixes an election date relative to the practice of 
allowing the governing party to set the date through discretion suggests the solution to a time 
inconsistency problem.  That is, even if greater transparency and predictability make it efficient 
ex ante for competing political parties to commit to hold elections at fixed intervals, the ability to 
treat governing durations as having a maximum with no necessary minimum gives the governing 
party ex post the ability to choose a more appropriate earlier date at which to call the next 
election.  Given the multitude of reasons for why an unexpected election call could be beneficial 
to the governing party, the ability to use discretion and hold elections earlier could well result in 
elections being held too early from the perspective of all electoral participants (other than the 
governing party).  The cost of holding more frequent elections, the foregone benefit of leaving 
term promises unfulfilled, initiated programs incomplete, and the disadvantage that surprise puts 
its rivals could be prevented by establishing a governing length that is longer on average and/or 
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more predictable in timing than that arising under discretion.6 Establishing the desirability of a 
change in the election rule such as this requires the demonstration either of the emergence of new 
efficiencies arising under the fixed rule or the growth of efficiency losses arising under 
discretion.  The latter would be signalled by the greater ability under discretion to use election 
calls to shorten the time available for rivals to adjust to an election call and the electorate to 
absorb the alternatives provided by competing parties. 
In the absence of an efficiency reason, institutional change would be promoted by the 
governing party if the fixed-term rule allowed for a more effective opportunistic strategy for 
pursuing re-election.  As institutional alternatives, the ability to choose the election date allows 
the governing party to “surf” on favourable (to it) exogenous events, while a fixed election term 
allows the governing party to better “manipulate” (deliberately use) public policy to achieve a 
favourable outcome (Khemani, 2004).7 Hence a governing party would surrender voluntarily the 
right to set the next election date if certain foreknowledge of the upcoming election date allowed 
better strategic timing in the implementation of public policy. By improving voters’ economic 
outcomes in the period leading into the upcoming election, the governing party could expect to 
achieve a greater likelihood of electoral success. For opportunism to drive institutional change 
there would need to arise a fall in the perceived gains from surfing relative to the gain that could 
be made from manipulating policy for strategic advantage. 
                                                 
6 It is interesting to note that Sweden changed its Riksdag term from three to four years in 1994 and New Zealand, 
which has a fixed maximum term of three rather than the more usual four years, has recently attempted to extend the 
term limit back to four years.  See The Dominion Post C8 March 2 2013.  For a discussion of the term length debate 
in Australia, see http://www.australiancollaboration.com.au/pdf/Democracy/Electoral-terms.pdf 
7 While parliamentary governments with discretion can also be expected to use policy to influence election 
outcomes, policies must be timed to target “expected” election dates that are often revised to take advantage of 
unanticipated circumstances.  Given that monetary policy, for example, takes up to two years before generating its 
expected effect, this makes the effective use of policy for electoral advantage less reliable (Ferris and Voia, 2012). 
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These alternatives are considered in this paper in relation to Canada’s gradual adoption of a 
four-year fixed election term at the federal and provincial levels.  The first—the ability to capture 
the efficiency gains from institutional change—relies on the initiating party being able to 
internalize a portion of a net efficiency gain.  The second reason—the adoption of a superior 
mechanism for political opportunism—requires a demonstration that the net benefits of surfing 
have fallen relative to manipulation.  Finally, it should be noted that these two reasons may not 
be mutually exclusive.  In particular, the possibility of foreclosing another party’s comparative 
opportunistic advantage could well be the factor precipitating the adoption of a superior long-run 
institutional outcome. Such a possibility would tie together the concepts of political competition 
and political innovation, as championed by political scientists such as Lowi (1963) and 
economists such as Douglas North, Manfred Streit, and Harold Berman (see the volume by 
Bernholz, Streit, and Vaubel, 1998). 
2. An efficiency case for moving from discretion to a rule 
Models of election timing within a Westminster parliamentary system typically view the 
governing party as choosing an optimal stopping point by trading off the certain value of 
remaining in office against the uncertain advantage of holding the election now versus later 
[Balke (1990), Smith (1996, 2003), Kayser (2005), Ferris and Voia (2009)].  Given that the 
Canadian constitution fixes only a maximum term (at five years), the governing party holds an 
advantage over its opposition by being able to surprise its rivals by calling an election earlier 
should external events unexpectedly improve its re-election prospects.  Examples of such events 
would include the emergence of internal dissent within the main opposition party, the renewed 
popularity of the governing party arising from the choice of a new party leader, the warm glow 
of entering the upper stage of a business cycle and/or the expectation of encountering a recession 
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towards the end of the current mandate.  Since it is also usual for a government to introduce its 
priority legislation earlier rather than later in its term, the cost of leaving some of its election 
promises unfulfilled becomes smaller towards the end of the mandate.  Hence when one 
considers the interests of the governing party alone, it is not surprising to find them choosing to 
serve less than a full term.8 
While the governing party can be expected to choose an election date by trading off the 
benefits and costs to it, it is quite clear that the benefits and costs to society do not coincide.  In 
particular, while the party and the voting electorate both lose from the premature termination of a 
promised legislative program, the incumbent’s private advantage secured by disadvantaging the 
preparation of its rivals is not similarly socially beneficial.9 Opportunism is by definition 
redistributive rather than socially productive. This implies the existence of an externality built 
into discretion, one that could lead to elections being held too early from the opposition’s point 
of view and with too little notice from a social rather than private perspective. While the 
incentive to go early may lead to elections being held too frequently with overly excessive 
operational election funding costs, the hidden but likely higher cost generated by surprise will 
appear as a type of incumbency advantage--the re-election of incumbent candidates, parties and 
perpetuation of party platforms that would not otherwise have succeeded in the presence of more 
meaningful electoral competition.10 A surprise election call can foreclose opposition parties’ 
ability to field their best set of candidates, truncate the time available to develop and propose 
                                                 
8 Note that a constitutional maximum prevents the governing party from being able to avoid unexpected bad events 
at the end by surfing beyond the term limit. Hence discretion here allows only one-sided re-adjustment, an 
asymmetry that prevents the average governing duration from rising to meet the permitted governing interval.   
9 This is not inconsistent with the co-presence of some social advantage. For example, election timing may be used 
to signal competency which would provide useful information to the electorate. See for example Rogoff and Sibert 
(1988) and Smith (1996).  
10 To use an Alchianism, haste need not make waste, haste makes for higher cost. 
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policy alternatives, prevent the articulation of counter arguments to newly proposed programs 
and reduce the time available for effective debate.11 
In many cases intertemporal externalities have been internalized by the promiser developing 
a reputation for innovation and winning credibility by maintaining its promises (Kein and 
Leffler, 1991), establishing a brand name for judicious, socially productive governance.  What 
makes such a strategy difficult to implement is that the promise to innovate is typically made by 
the party while in opposition, making the commitment time-inconsistent once the party is 
elected.  That is, the electorate knows that once in power the value to the governing party of 
maintaining its promise not to hold a surprise election will fall relative to the value of having that 
promise maintained when in opposition.  Once in power, the strategic value of reneging and 
surprising its opposition can overcome the electoral value of maintaining its commitment.12  
Foreknowledge of the predictable change in the incentives that underlie the use of discretion can 
then undermine the credibility of the promise. 
To what extent does the data suggest that election calls are too frequent under discretion?  In 
Canada’s case, while the constitution allows governments to last for up to five years, very few of 
Canada’s governing parties have chosen to remain in office for their full mandate (Ferris and 
Voia, 2009).  Indeed, between 1867 and 2007 Canada had thirty nine federal elections, implying 
that elections were held, on average every 3.6 years.  Hence federal parties have typically used 
only seventy percent of their permitted governing tenure. Similarly, most of Canada’s provinces 
                                                 
11 Note that the existence of an externality need not mean that the externality should be corrected--the externality 
becomes a meaningful social cost only when the cost of correcting it becomes lower than the problem itself. 
12 Robert Ghiz, the Premier who introduced fixed term legislation in Prince Edward Island (PEI) in 2008 is quoted 
as seeing its introduction as his biggest mistake once he was in power.  See the Wayne Thibodeau interview in The 
Guardian, December 19, 2014. 
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and both territories have averaged less than four years between general elections.13  A first view 
of election frequency is then not inconsistent with the hypothesis that discretion led to overly 
short governing durations in Canada.  The adoption of a fixed four year term would have 
increased duration on average and lowered average election costs.14 
However, it is quickly recognized that the Westminster parliamentary system allows a 
government to last only as long as it can maintain a voting majority in the House.  The historic 
inability of minority governments to do so has meant that the governing durations of minority 
governments are typically much shorter (1.4 years on average). Moreover because the legislation 
setting the four-year governing term for majority governments does not affect the confidence 
provisions of the constitution, the dynamics and durations of minority governments would be 
largely unaffected.  Hence a more appropriate measure of the governing duration arising under 
discretion would be the average duration of majority governments. When minority governments 
are excluded, the average duration of a federal government rises to 4.2 years.15 In the case of the 
provinces, this is much less dramatic.  The incidence of minority governments in Canada’s 
provinces has been much less frequent (most provinces having had had between 1 and 3 minority 
governments over the post-confederation period), leaving the average length of a provincial 
governing term only slightly less than 4 years.16   
                                                 
13 New Brunswick (4.0) and Saskatchewan (4.08) form the two exceptions, with most provinces in the range of 3.6-
3.7 years between elections.  Newfoundland and Labrador (Nfld) is the outlier on the low side, with elections held 
on average every 3.4 years. See the Data Appendix for more detail. 
14 Roy and Alcantara (2013) consider and reject the possibility of a connection between changes in campaigning 
financing rules and the adoption of fixed terms.  
15 Only six of Canada’s forty two post Confederation federal governments lasted as long as 4.8 years and two of 
these were during the two world wars, 1917 and 1940 (Elections Canada, Appendix 3). 
16 The outliers are Manitoba and Ontario with 8 and 6 minority governments prior to fixed term legislation. 
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It follows that for post-Confederation Canadian governments, federal and provincial, the 
adoption of a four year term would not greatly change the length of governing durations.17 This 
in turn means that the data is inconsistent with the hypothesis that significant operational savings 
could be realized by the early adoption of a fixed election dating rule.  From an institutional 
perspective, then, political competition through the governing party’s use of discretion has not 
unduly shortened governing tenures on average nor is there much evidence to suggest that a 
downward trend in term durations was experienced in the period leading into the adoption of 
fixed term length.18 
Even though governing durations have not fallen under discretion, evidence consistent with 
growth in the size of the surprise externality would appear if either governing durations were 
becoming more variable (less predictable) and/or if the length of time given opposition parties to 
prepare for upcoming elections was being shortened in the period leading into the establishment 
of fixed governing lengths.  In Figures 1a and 1d we show term durations and the time available 
for campaigning in each of the eleven elections that led into the passing of fixed term legislation 
in four major Canadian political jurisdictions--the federal government (Canada) and the three 
largest provinces by population: Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia (BC).19   
                                                 
17 It has been argued that the four year term may have been chosen precisely because it most closely mimics current 
practice.  As Professor Blackburn is quoted as arguing, ‘The proposal for fixed term Parliament as a whole should fit 
as closely as possible into existing constitutional expectations, and the idea that four years is about the right length 
of time between elections is very prevalent’ (Hazell, 2010, p.14). 
18 There is some suggestion at the federal level that governing durations have fallen through time.  For example, 
regressing federal durations across consecutive parliaments (p_number = 1..39 from 1867 to 2008) while controlling 
for minority government status, partisanship (using the more liberal of the two major party types) and the percentage 
of seats won by the governing party, we find, 
Governing Duration = 2.49 - 0.016 p_number – 1.92 Minority + 0.356 Liberal + 0.029 Seats 
         (2.68) (1.77)            (4.62)          (1.15)       (2.20) 
with Adj R2= .627 and D.W. = 2.4 and where duration is measured in years. The absolute value of the t-statistic is 
included in brackets below the OLS coefficient estimate.  Here the time effect is significantly different from zero 
only at the ten percent significance level. There is no evidence of a similar time effect arising for the provinces. 
19 BC was the first jurisdiction in Canada to establish a fixed four year term, while BC, Ontario and Quebec together 
incorporate seventy five percent of Canada’s population. 
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--insert Figures 1a and 1b about here-- 
It is apparent from Figure 1a that duration variability under discretion has been significant in 
all of Canada’s political jurisdictions.  However, while the variance of future governing terms 
will necessarily fall once a fixed term is adopted so that surprise will become less of a factor, 
there is no evidence that the variability of governing durations did increase in the period leading 
into the adoption of fixed terms.  To the extent that unpredictable governing lengths have been a 
concern for opposition parties and the electorate as a whole under discretion, the scale of that 
problem does not appear to have increased.  On the other hand, there is evidence that the number 
of days allotted for campaigning--the days arising between the laying down of Writs (dissolving 
parliament) and the next election date--have fallen across the eleven elections leading into the 
legislation of fixed terms.20 As can be seen from Figure 1b, the length of time given to election 
campaigning has trended downwards in all four jurisdiction over the last five elections and, 
except for Quebec, in all other jurisdictions for the six elections preceding that. The case of the 
federal government is perhaps the most striking with the number of days allowed for 
campaigning falling roughly in half between 1965 (the 11th) and 1996 (the 3rd) when the length 
stabilized at 36 days.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, the constancy at 36 days of the three election 
periods prior to Stephen Harper’s election in 2006 followed a change to the 1996 Elections Act 
that reduced the minimum campaign length from 47 to 36 days. 
In the period following the establishment of fixed election dates, provincial campaigns 
lengths have not increased, typically remaining at their now shortened levels.21 However, 
                                                 
20 The Canada Elections Act imposes a limit on all election expenses during the election period ‘to facilitate a level 
playing field among candidates’. Prime Ministers have traditionally imposed the minimum period both to constrain 
the time available to rivals and to constrain rival expenditures (since increasing the election beyond the current 36 
day minimum increases the daily amount that can be spent by rivals by 1/37 of the limit set for the minimum). 
21 BC and Quebec campaign lengths remained constant at 28 and 34 days respectively, while Ontario’s stayed at 30 
except for the early election call of the Wynne government in 2014. The main exception to constancy is in the 
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foreknowledge of when the election campaign will begin is very different from either being 
surprised by its sudden start or knowing, when in opposition, that the upcoming election will be 
held at the worst possible time. Foreknowledge gives the parties in opposition more opportunity 
to enter the campaign period prepared, allowing the campaign period to elicit a higher quality of 
opposition and standard of debate.  This implies that candidates can be better chosen and more 
highly prepared, existing programs made subject to more informed critique and new policy 
alternatives better articulated. The result is the opportunity to create a more informed electorate 
and better opposition that in turn will raise the standard of performance expected from the 
incumbent party and result in higher quality governance. 
If, as we have been arguing, the externality associated with discretion has increased in the 
period leading into the adoption of fixed term legislation, the associated fall off in candidate 
competency, alternative program evaluation and incentive to innovate should result in a loss of 
candidate quality and Parliamentary efficiency.  The difficulty is finding ways of measuring this. 
One metric of a rise in the scope of this externality would be a reduction in legislative work 
undertaken across successive governments.22 Figure 2 plots for the federal government the 
number of bills passed by the House and by the Senate in the thirty parliaments that followed the 
11th Parliament in 1908.  As illustrated, there has been a persistent decline in the number of bills 
passed across successive Parliaments and the same pattern is repeated if we had look at the 
number of bills passed per year.23 
                                                 
federal government where the first campaign period that followed the first 4 year majority government rose 
dramatically from 37 to 78 days.  
22 Aggregate data on bills initiated and passed are readily available only for the Parliament of Canada and only from 
the second session of the 11th Parliament onward (November 1909). See the website listed in references. Note that 
while bills can be introduced and passed separately by both the House of Commons and the Senate, a bill must be 
passed by both before proceeding to receive royal ascent from the Governor General.  
23 The sharp troughs in the diagram correspond to parliaments with minority governments. Despite the appearance, 
the addition of minority status to the regressions presented below adds no explanatory power. This implies that the 
effect of minority status on bill passage arises primarily because of its shorter length. 
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-- insert Table 1 (Descriptive Statistics) and Table 2 about here – 
To assess the trend in parliamentary performance more formally, we use regression analysis 
to examine two dimensions of federal legislative efficiency:  the total number bills passed during 
each parliament and the number of bills passed per year by successive parliaments.  The 
regressions then test the hypothesis that legislative efficiency has declined across successive 
parliaments controlling for the length of each parliament, the degree of competition in the House 
of Commons (the percentage of seats held by the governing party), the average degree of 
electoral competition within political constituencies (the average winning margin), and a 
measure of partisanship (whether the governing party was Liberal).24  The regression results of 
these two tests are shown in Table 2 for the thirty successive parliaments on which we have data 
(the 11th Parliament through the 40th Parliament). 
 The results show that after controlling for the length of each parliament and minority 
status, the total number of bills passed and the number of bills passed per year have trended 
downward across consecutive parliaments leading to the present. Over the last thirty parliaments, 
the number of bills passed by the House has fallen by over 50 per year and 180 overall.  If one 
extends the notion of efficiency to include the ratio of bills passed relative to bills introduced, 
this ratio has fallen by over 30 percent over the same interval.25 
                                                 
24 As emphasized by one of our referees, it is important to note that the regressions do not control for any change in 
the average content and quality of each piece of legislation. Hence the results imply an overall decline in federal 
legislative efficiency only if each piece of legislation did not increase in quantity sufficiently to offset the measured 
decline in quantitative performance. This became a particularly important consideration with respect to the Harper 
government (39th to 41st Parliaments) that tended to use large omnibus budget bills (of up to 321 pages in length) to 
guarantee passage of a bundle of traditionally separate, but controversial, bills.  
25 Where Ratio equals the ratio of bills passed to bills introduced, 
Ratio = 0.305 – 0.012 Trend + .055 Duration + 0.530 ratio(-1) where AdjR2 = .875 and DW = 2.12.   
                         (1.92)   (2.90)              (4.15)                 (4.34) 
The absolute value of the t-statistic is in brackets below the OLS coefficient estimates. 
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The effects of the control variables are of interest in their own right. The importance of 
parliamentary length can be seen in the scale economies found for duration. The results suggest 
that not only do parliaments with longer durations accomplish more but also proportionally 
more—increasing the number of bills passed per parliamentary year. The controls also highlight 
some of the divergent effects of political competition found in other studies.  For example, the 
regressions indicate that parliaments in which political competition within the House is lower 
(that is, the governing party has a larger governing majority) pass fewer bills in total and fewer 
bills per year.  This is consistent with the hypothesis that less competition generates more rent 
seeking (Solé-Ollé (2006), Ferris, Park and Winer (2008)) where rent seeking appears here as 
less legislative effort.  In addition, the larger is the average winning margin across electoral 
constituencies, the larger has been both the total number of bills passed and the number passed 
per year.  This is consistent with the hypothesis that less competition within constituencies 
allows for greater individual autonomy, giving the parties less control over its individual 
members and resulting in more individual bill introductions and bill passages (Ferris and Winer 
(2013)).  Lastly, there is some suggestion in the data that partisan type has played a role with 
respect to legislation passed but this effect is statistically very weak.   
It follows that while many factors may have contributed to the quantitative decline in number 
of bills passed, the data are consistent with a decline in legislative efficiency and thus the 
hypothesis that the externality present in the incumbent’s choice of election date has grown 
through time.  To the extent this inefficiency is attributable to the more effective use of election 
dating, foreknowledge of the next election date allows the opposition to be better prepared for 
the next election, decreasing the disadvantage of being in opposition.  By improving the relative 
position of opposition parties, the degree of competition in the political process is also increased. 
14 
 
In this sense, legislating a fixed governing term would also allow the governing party both to 
tackle and fulfill a larger proportion of its promised legislative mandate. 
What is less clear, however, is what the incumbent political party gains from implementing 
this change. Even if a fixed election date generates a superior outcome overall, at least part of 
this improvement comes at the cost of improving the position of one’s rivals.  Unless the 
incumbent can gain sufficient electoral credit as the innovator of this institutional reform, the 
realized loss from generating greater predictability in election timing for rivals could easily 
dominate.  The disadvantage of being unable to choose the most appropriate time for an election 
would at best delay the adoption of favourable institutional change and at worst could prevent its 
adoption. 
3. Does policy opportunism under fixed terms offer a competitive advantage over surfing 
under discretion? 
While we have argued above that discretion over election timing gives the incumbent party 
the ability to use surprise to disadvantage its rivals, it is well known that there is a recognition or 
credentialing factor present in all systems that that provides the incumbent an electoral advantage 
(Gelman and King, 1990; Mayhew, 2008; Kendall and Rekkas, 2012).  There is also a consensus, 
at least for the U.S. that this incumbency advantage has increased since WW2 (Ansolabehere and 
Snyder, 2001).  For this paper, however, I assume that this “pure” incumbency advantage is 
independent of whether the election term is fixed or flexible.26 Recent work by Kendall and 
Rekkas (2012) attributes the incumbency effect in Canada primarily to the personal 
                                                 
26 Note, however, that when comparing tenure/incumbency across alternative fixed length U.S. elected offices, 
Glazer and Grofman (1987) have shown that re-election probabilities are higher in shorter term offices so that U.S. 
“House and Senate members have had careers of virtually equal length” (p. 555).  
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characteristics of the legislator rather than to the characteristics of the political party, suggesting 
that this assumption is not implausible. 
Aside from the recognition or credentialing value of being an incumbent, the leader and/or 
party in power has the advantage of being able to use the characteristics of the voting rule to its 
advantage—whether to surf on advantageous events under discretionary timing or to manipulate 
economic outcomes under a fixed term by its control over policy. Because our maintained 
hypothesis is that political parties and their leaders will use the opportunities available under 
their respective electoral rules to maximize their probability of re-election, one ordinal measure 
of the political effectiveness of a particular system in promoting re-election would be the 
existence of a long-run difference in the re-election rates across alternative electoral systems.  
Hence by comparing the success in re-electing federal party of the prime-minister in Canada 
since Confederation (in 1867) relative to re-electing a president of the same party over the same 
period we have one metric of the advantage given to the governing party of competing under 
flexible versus fixed electoral terms.  In making that comparison it should be recognized that 
Canadian federal leaders have a policy coordination advantage in that Canadian prime ministers 
always control the largest party in parliament and hence can dictate policy.  In the U.S. the 
president must often govern with the either or both of the Houses of Congress controlled by the 
opposition party.  This implies that such a comparative test will be biased against fixed term 
superiority. 
Turning first to Canada, of the 41 federal elections held since Confederation (through 2011) 
25 were won by the incumbent governing party—a combination of surfing, incumbency, and 
policy manipulation leading to a success rate of 61 percent. The equivalent rate for successfully 
re-electing a U.S. president from the same party (following the 1st Grant administration of 1868) 
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has been only 58 percent, 21 of 35 opportunities.  It would then appear that the fixed election 
term alternative has been less rather than more effective in producing successful outcomes for 
incumbent party leaders. On the other hand, the president’s ability to use policy successfully to 
manipulate economic outcomes for election purposes depends strongly on whether the president 
has sympathetic policy partners within the House of Representatives and Senate (for analogous 
conditions under monetary policy, see Abrams and Iossifov (2006) and Ferris (2008)).  Hence if 
we look only at instances when the president and the majority in the House of Representatives 
were from the same political party, the success ratio in U.S. presidential elections rises from 58% 
to 63% (12 of 19 cases).  If this is the more relevant case for comparison, then opportunism has 
been practiced at the federal level with roughly the same degree of success under both sets of 
electoral rules.   
If we turn from the federal to the provincial and state level, evidence on incumbency success 
is more mixed.  The incumbency success rate is typically higher in the Canadian provinces than 
at the federal level, with Quebec (the lowest) at 61 percent, 63 percent for BC, 70 percent for 
Manitoba, and 75 and 83 percent, respectively, for Ontario and Alberta.27 In the U.S., Besley and 
Case (1992) report that over the thirty years of their study (1960-1989), “there are only two years 
in which more than half of all incumbents [i.e., governors] were re-elected (p.4).” On the other 
hand, the Center on the American Governor (at Rutgers University) reports that the success rate 
of incumbent governors running for re-election has risen continuously from 63.5% in the 1960’s 
to 80% in the 1990’s and 2000’s.28 To the extent that state and provincial electoral races are 
comparable, the dramatically rising rate of incumbency success under fixed state governing 
                                                 
27 BC’s number is calculated from the 10th election onwards and excludes two war year coalition governments while  
Manitoba is from the 4th election onwards. For more detail see the summary table in the data appendix. 
28 See http://governors.rutgers.edu/on-governors/us-governors/when-governors-seek-re-election/ 
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terms could help to explain the timing of the trend towards fixed term adoption across the 
Canadian provinces.  Indeed British Columbia, with the second lowest incumbency success rate 
(63%), was the first to adopt fixed terms while Alberta, with the highest success rate under 
discretion (83%), has been among the last to adopt fixed terms.  On the other hand, there are too 
many exceptions. Quebec, for example, has the lowest provincial incumbency success rate (at 
61%) and was the last province to adopt fixed terms while Nfld, with the second highest 
incumbency success rate (82%) was among the first. Thus while the evidence is somewhat 
mixed, there is no convincing pattern consistent with the belief that opportunism through policy 
manipulation under fixed election terms has been more successful than surfing under 
discretion.29 
4. The timing of institutional change:  the confluence of efficiency and redistribution 
If moving to a fixed election date carries no clear opportunistic advantage relative to 
discretion but imposes an immediate cost on the incumbent by forcing it to forego its current 
discretionary advantage, what would be the incentive for the governing political party to propose 
and initiate institutional change?  One immediate answer is that the proposal to change the 
timing rule is less likely to arise when the initiating party is in power, more likely to arise when 
the proposing party is in opposition.  But this response merely pushes the problem one stage 
onward by raising the question of why the opposition party would go through with its promise 
once elected. To some extent the answer must come from the ability of the initiating party to gain 
electoral credit for initiating an institutional change that the electorate recognizes as producing 
                                                 
29 The period leading into the adoption of fixed election dating in Canada (the late 1990s and early 2000s) coincides 
with the period of stable economic growth leading into the 2007/8 financial crisis and following recession. That 
period of stability—the Great Moderation—was often attributed to better informed policy and more effective control 
over the economy. To the extent that incumbent governing parties believed that control over the economy by means 
of fiscal and monetary policy was increasingly effective, the case for a fixed term would rise relative to discretion.  
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an efficiency advantage.  A corollary is that after campaigning on the proposal, the initiating 
party recognizes that it faces a potential penalty from reneging on its campaign promise.30   
If political parties were equally adept at selling institutional reform to the electorate and 
equally adept at implementing policy, then we would expect a more or less random pattern of 
adoption by all jurisdictions at roughly the same time. The existence of a pattern to when and 
where fixed terms were adopted might then suggest circumstances indicating which political 
party would be the one to champion change and when such a change would take place.  An 
extension of our approach to this problem suggests that the party instituting change will be the 
one with the most to gain by adopting fixed terms and foreclosing the use of discretion. The data 
appendix at the end of the paper provides a summary table of the circumstances within each 
jurisdiction at the time fixed election terms were established.  
Beginning at the federal level in Canada, a fixed election term formed part of the package 
of electoral reforms that characterized the re-emergence of the Conservative Party out of the 
remnants of the Progressive Conservative Party and the grass-roots conservatism of the emerging 
Reform Party (later, Canadian Alliance). This followed the virtual disintegration of the 
Progressive Conservative Party in 1993 (representation in the House falling from 167 to 2 
members) and a 10-year long period of the restructuring of conservative support in Canada, 
culminating in its consolidation as the Conservative Party under the leadership of Stephen 
Harper. The proposal to adopt a fixed election term then formed part of the strategy of the new 
Conservative Party to offer a platform of striking reforms to capture the interest of voters.  The 
                                                 
30 The current Trudeau Liberal government finds itself in just such a position, having proposed dropping the first-
past-the-post electoral system for proportional representation when in opposition and now having to deal with its 
revised evaluation of the two systems once in power.   
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strategy proved successful, leading to first of three successive Conservative Party governments 
in 2006.   
Even without the need for new proposals to re-capture the attention of the electorate, a 
look at the historical record of re-election success in Canada reveals that of the 16 cases prior to 
2006 when a ‘conservative’ government was incumbent, the conservative party succeeded in 
winning re-election only 8 times, for a winning percentage of 50%.  Liberal governments, on the 
other hand, were successful in 15 of 22 cases or 68% of the time.  It follows that foregoing the 
right to choose the next election date would constitute a lower cost for (be a greater benefit to) 
the Conservative Party in Canada.  Featuring institutional reform as part of the party’s policy 
platform while in opposition would then be a relatively attractive strategy for the Conservative 
Party, especially if the fixed election date had an overall efficiency advantage and the party 
believed it had better policy credentials for managing the economy and perhaps manipulating 
policy.  It is then no surprise to find that it was the Conservative Party that initiated the 
innovation in institutional rules governing Canadian federal elections. 
This prediction for the characteristic of the party proposing institutional reform is consistent 
with Theodore Lowi’s hypothesis concerning the incidence of political innovation.31  Lowi 
(1963) argues that there is little political incentive to advocate reform when elections are close 
and the result uncertain, but becomes a profitable strategy for the weaker challenger in a two 
party system when traditional success is less likely and the sale of reform has the possibility of 
overcoming an incumbency advantage.  Not only do these circumstances fit the case of the 
Harper Conservative government but the theory also helps to explain the incidence and timing of 
fixed term adoption across Canada’s provincial governments. For example, Gordon Campbell’s 
                                                 
31 See Roy and Alcantara (2013) for an alternative complementary way of explaining the timing of the adoption of 
fixed terms across Canada. 
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Liberal government in British Columbia had been out of power for more than fifty years before 
winning election in 2001 by promising a set of dramatic tax and spending cuts along with fixed 
term legislation.  Somewhat less strikingly Danny Williams’s 2004 Progressive Conservative 
government in Newfoundland had been out of power for 4 elections and 15 years, while Dalton 
McGuinty’s 2003 Liberal government in Ontario had been out of power for 4 elections and 13 
years.  All represent cases where a new (or relatively new) elected leader of a party that had 
experienced little recent electoral success offered a number of electoral reforms (including fixed 
election terms) while in opposition and then followed through to adopt them upon election. The 
situation in Saskatchewan (2008) follows the same pattern. There a new leader (Brad Wall) of a 
conservative party (the Saskatchewan Party) in a province where the last conservative 
government had been elected 16 years earlier adopted fixed election terms.  Prince Edward 
Island (2008), Quebec (2013) and New Brunswick (2007) differ only in having relatively new 
leaders (Robert Ghiz, Pauline Marois, and Shawn Graham) of parties that had been out of power 
for a minimum of 2 terms and seven or more years.32 Finally, the provincial exception to the 
adoption of fixed terms (Nova Scotia) is also consistent with Lowi’s competitiveness prediction. 
That is, the balanced strength of the competing political parties in Nova Scotia can be seen in 
that the last five general elections have resulted in two Progressive Conservative (PC), one 
Liberal and one NDP majority government, together with one minority PC government. 
There remain two important exceptions to the pattern exhibited above: Manitoba in 2008 and 
Alberta in 2011.  The Alberta case is different in that a fixed election term was adopted by a 
party (the Progressive Conservative party) that was experiencing a long history (40 years) of 
continuous governance. The similarity arises in that fixed terms were adopted by a newly elected 
                                                 
32 Pauline Marois’ minority government lost the next election following its call much earlier than its fixed next date. 
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leader (Alison Redford) in a party with internal dissent and one that was expected to lose the 
upcoming election to the opposition conservative party, the Wildrose Party.33 Despite winning a 
surprise victory and establishing fixed terms, Redford soon lost the support of her party and was 
forced to resign as leader.  Jim Prentice, the newly elected leader, then called an election one 
year before the fixed date and surprisingly lost to the previous third place party, the New 
Democratic Party (NDP).  Manitoba, on the other hand, does represent a full exception to the 
general rule.  Although Greg Selinger was a new leader of the Manitoba NDP when they adopted 
fixed election terms, the NDP was already well established in power, having been in office for 
the three previous terms (under Gary Doer) and being under no particular threat of internal 
dissent or facing imminent electoral defeat. 
Despite this exception, the general pattern—fixed election terms proposed by the newly 
elected leader of a party that was typically in opposition and with little recent electoral success—
is broadly consistent with Lowi’s hypothesis explaining the timing and identity of initiators of 
institutional innovation.  For such an innovation to be retained, however, there must be an 
underlying efficiency gain.  In the case of Canada, we attribute this to the creative use of a 
governance rule that can overcome the time-inconsistency externality associated with election 
dating discretion.   
5. Conclusion 
 In this paper the circumstances surrounding the incumbent political party’s willingness to 
surrender its right to set the timing of elections in Canada’s federal and provincial jurisdictions 
are analyzed as a way of explaining the timing of innovation in the institutional rules governing 
                                                 
33 Here it could be argued that effective opposition was internal and that Alison Redford’s adoption of fixed terms 
(among other reforms) was part of a strategy for a newcomer to overcome the incumbency advantage of the old 
guard in the PC party in Alberta.  
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elections in a Westminster parliamentary system.  What makes this institutional innovation of 
particular interest is that the change arises in the context of a constitution that requires the 
governing party to maintain the confidence of the House of Commons (rather than serve out a 
full term).  In addition, the innovation must be proposed and supported through legislation by the 
party that will lose a significant electoral advantage once the fixed term rule comes into effect.  
While the long-lived nature of the two dominant political parties in Canada offers a mechanism 
through which social improvements can be captured through reputation and brand name, the 
imperfect ability to do so suggests that timely change can be thwarted or delayed by the time 
inconsistency created by discretion.  That is, what may appear to be an optimal change when in 
opposition will no longer appear so once in power. 
Theodore Lowi (1963, 575) has argued that political innovation, “coopting new interest, 
expressing new ideas, making changes in established commitments,” is most likely to arise in 
alternating two party systems where one of the two parties has been relatively weak.  In 
Canada’s case the timing of the adoption of fixed electoral terms for majority governments at the 
federal and provincial levels is broadly consistent with just such an asymmetry. The long period 
in the political wilderness following the virtual disintegration of the Progressive Conservative 
Party in 1993 meant the new grouping that became the Conservative Party was more willing to 
innovate for success. The fact that historically the Liberal Party has had relatively more success 
in the use of election timing made its relinquishing of that right that much easier.  Similarly, the 
adoption of a fixed term in British Columbia by a first-time successful Liberal Party, by a newly 
created and recently deposed Saskatchewan Party in Saskatchewan, and following the emergence 
of new leaders in parties that had been out of power for significant periods in Newfoundland, 
PEI and Quebec are all consistent that asymmetry. 
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That the political parties proposing fixed term legislation chose to fulfill their promise to 
legislate upon election and, when in majority, chose to maintain that promise throughout their 
governing term is an indication that there is an intermediate road for establishing credibility 
somewhere between the rigidity of a constitutional amendment and the complete lack of 
credibility in a typically unenforceable election promise.  In Canada’s case, the willingness of the 
majority Harper government to serve out its full term despite a looming economic recession 
(coming from a rapid decline in commodity, particularly oil, prices) is consistent with the belief 
that a precedent would be established that could reinforce the political cost of reneging on the 
recently established fixed term. Once the commitment to the rule is formalized in legislation and 
reinforced through precedent, reneging on that commitment would have undermined the 
credibility of all other party promises in a highly visible way.  By not reneging, the initiator also 
increases the political cost to its rivals of breaking the established rule by requiring that party 
either to formally change legislation and/or explain to the electorate the special reasons for early 
dissolution. The fact that calls for premature dissolution under majority governments have been 
few and far between in Canada and, when undertaken early, have been largely unsuccessful is a 
sign that fixed governing terms are becoming a regularized feature of election practice.  As such 
this suggests that significant innovation in rules requiring commitment can arise in cases that 
cannot command the enforceability granted by constitutional protection. 
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Data Appendix 
Characteristics of Legislative Acts and circumstances surrounding Fixing Election Dates across Canadian Political Jurisdictions 
Date of 
Enactment Jurisdiction Frequency 
Circumstances Surrounding 
Enactment 
Years out 
of power 
before 
legislation 
New Party 
Leader as 
Premier? 
Average 
governing 
duration 
prior to 
enactment 
Minority 
Govern-
ments 
Incumbent 
Success rate 
before fixed 
term 
2011-12-08 
 
27th 
Legislature 
Alberta Between March 1 
and May 31 every 
4 years. 
The first fixed 
date election was 
held in 2012 and 
the second set for 
2016 but was 
called earlier in 
2015-05-05. 
The policy was enacted by the new 
leader of the established PC Party 
majority government (Alison Redford) 
mid-way through the 27th Legislature 
begun in 2008. After winning a surprise 
re-election in April 2012, Redford lost 
the support of her party and resigned as 
leader.  The newly elected leader of the 
PC party, Jim Prentice, called an early 
election and lost to the previous third 
place party (NDP). 
0 Yes 
(Alison 
Redford) 
3.96 0 83% 
2001-08-27 
 
37th 
Legislature 
British 
Columbia 
2nd Tuesday in 
May every 4 
years. 
The first fixed 
date election was 
held on 2005-05-
16. 
The policy was enacted by the Liberal 
Party majority government that was 
formed following the 37th general 
election in 2001. Prior to this the Liberal 
Party had last been elected in 1941.   
16 
elections 
and 56 
years 
No 
(Gordon 
Campbell) 
3.61 3 63%   
10th election 
onward 
2007-05-13 
 
39th 
Parliament 
Canada 
 
3rd Monday in 
October every 4 
years. 
The first fixed 
date election was 
held on 2015-10-
19.34 
The policy was enacted by a minority 
Conservative Party government 
following the 39th general election held 
in 2006. The Conservative Party had 
been out of office since 1993 (when it 
was the PC Party).  
4 elections 
and 13 
years 
No 
(Stephen 
Harper) 
3.56 13 61% 
2008-10-09 
 
39th 
Legislature 
Manitoba 3rd Tuesday in 
April every 4 
years. 
 
The first fixed 
term election was 
on 2011-10-04. 
The policy was enacted by the NDP 
majority government that was formed 
following the 39th general election that 
was held in 2007. This was the third 
consecutive NDP majority government, 
with the NDP having been in office since 
1999. 
0 Yes 
(Greg 
Selinger) 
3.61 8 70% 
                                                 
34 Note that two Canadian federal general elections followed the enactment of fixed election dates that were held earlier than scheduled (in 2008 and 2011). These were both 
involved minority Conservative governments. 
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2007-06-26 
 
36th 
Legislature 
 
New 
Brunswick 
4th Monday in 
September every 
4 years. 
The first fixed 
date election was 
on 2010-09-27. 
The policy was enacted by the majority 
Liberal Party government after the 36th 
general election following 
Confederation. The previous two general 
elections were won by the PC Party.  
2 elections 
and 7 years 
No 
(Shawn 
Graham) 
4 0 70.5% 
 19th election 
onward 
2004-12-16 
 
17th 
Legislature 
after 
joining 
Canada in 
1949 
Newfoundland 
and Labrador 
2nd Tuesday in 
May every 4 
years. 
 
The first fixed 
date election was 
held on 2007-10-
09. 
The policy was enacted by the PC Party 
majority government that was formed 
following the 45th general election that 
was held in 2004, which was the 17th 
general election following 
Confederation. The PC Party had been 
out of office since 1989.  
4 elections 
and 15 
years 
Yes 
(Danny 
Williams) 
3.375 1 82% 
2006-11-02 
 
15th 
Legislature 
Northwest 
Territories 
1st Monday in 
October every 4 
years. 
The first fixed 
date election was 
held in 2007. 
The electoral process in the Northwest 
Territories does not recognise political 
parties. 
na Yes 
(Joe 
Handley) 
5 na  
2014-03-19 
 
4th 
Legislature 
Nunavut Last Monday in 
October every 4 
years.  
The electoral process in the Nunavut 
does not recognise political parties. 
na (Peter 
Taptuna) 
na na  
2005-12-15 
 
38th 
Legislature 
Ontario 1st Thursday in 
October every 4 
years. 
The first fixed 
date election was 
held on 2007-10-
10. 
The policy was enacted by the Liberal 
Party majority government formed after 
the 38th general election held in 2003. 
The Liberal Party had formed the 
government from 1987 to 1990 but 
before this had not been in office since 
1943. 
4 elections 
and 13 
years 
No 
(Dalton 
McGinty) 
3.68 6 75% 
2008-05-22 
 
38th 
Legislature  
Prince Edward 
Island 
1st Monday in 
October every 4 
years. 
The first fixed 
term election was 
held on 2011-10-
03. 
The policy was enacted by the Liberal 
Party majority government formed 
following the 38th general election held 
following Confederation. The Liberal 
Party was last in office in 1996.  
3 elections 
and 11 
years 
No 
(Robert 
Ghiz) 
3.63 1 65% 
26 
 
2013-06-14 
 
40th 
Legislature 
Quebec 1st Monday in 
October every 4 
years 
 
The first fixed 
term election was 
held on 2014-04-
07. 
The policy was enacted by the Parti 
Quebecois minority government that was 
formed following the 40th general 
election that was held in 2012. The 
minority Parti Quebecois lasted less than 
two years. 
3 elections 
and 9 years 
No 
(Pauline 
Marois) 
3.65 3 61% 
2008-04-28 
 
26th 
Legislature 
Saskatchewan 1st Monday in 
November every 
4 years. 
 
The first fixed 
term election was 
held on 2011-11-
07. 
The policy was enacted by the 
Saskatchewan Party—the main 
conservative-leaning provincial political 
party in Saskatchewan in the early 21st 
century—a majority government formed 
following the 26th general election in 
2007. A conservative-leaning party had 
not formed government in Saskatchewan 
since the PC Party left office in 1991.  
4 elections 
and 16 
years 
(since the 
last 
conservati
ve 
governmen
t) 
Yes 
(Brad 
Wall) 
4.08 1 77% 
No fixed 
date 
adopted 
Nova Scotia 
and Yukon 
  na  3.74 3  
 
Sources 
Date of Enactment by jurisdiction: “Fixed-date elections in Canada,” Library of Parliament, Canada. Available online at 
http://www.lop.parl.gc.ca/ParlInfo/Compilations/ProvinceTerritory/ProvincialFixedElections.aspx?SortColumn=ResultDate&SortDirection=ASC. Retrieved on 9 September 2016. 
Provincial election data available on line at Elections Ontario,Elections British Columbia etc. 
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Figure 2 
 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Characteristics of Canadian Federal Governments: 11th through 40th Parliaments 
Variable Mean Maximum  Minimum Std. 
Deviation 
ADF 
Duration (in years) 3.25 6.00 0.50 1.49 -5.78 
Minority Governments 0.323 1.00 0.00 0.475 -4.80 
Liberal Party 
Governments 
0.581 1.00 0.00 0.50 -5.05 
Seats (percentage) 55.4 78.0 40.0 10.64 -5.14 
Winning Margin 
(fraction) 
0.200 0.451 0.128 0.058 -4.83 
HOC_bills_passed 178.9 190.5 6.00 125.4 -5.38* 
HOC_passed_per_year 50.63 96.5 12.0 21.03 -2.85 
Ratio of bills passed 0.428 0.827 0.019 0.290 -2.81* 
Mackinnon (1996) 1% (5%) [10%] critical values: -3.66 (-2.96) [-2.62]; * constant and trend  
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Tests of Legislative Efficiency in Canada’s Federal Parliaments: 1908–2008 
(absolute value of t-statistic in brackets) 
 
Observations are by 
sucessive Parliaments 
Number of Bills passed by the 
House per year 
House Bills passed per electoral 
term 
Constant 
 
84.2*** 
(5.08)  
208.2*** 
(3.12) 
Trend 
 
-1.76*** 
(6.57) 
-6.59*** 
(6.10) 
Parliament duration 
(in years) 
7.03*** 
(3.53) 
73.89*** 
(9.20) 
Proportion of seats held by 
the winning party 
-0.535* 
(1.92) 
-2.39** 
(2.08) 
Winning vote margin 
 
83.77** 
(2.17) 
257.97 
(1.66) 
Liberal Party  
 
-0.691 
(0.158) 
-33.08* 
(1.78) 
Statistics 
Number of Obs. 
Adj. R2 
D.W. 
 
       30 
0.674 
2.11 
 
30 
0.851 
2.5 
***(**)[*] significantly different from zero at 1% (5%) {10%] 
Political Competition Variables: 
Proportion of seats = percentage of seats won by the governing party in each parliament 
Winning vote margin = the average winning vote margin across federal constituencies, where the winning margin is 
defined as the difference in vote shares received by the first versus second place finisher in each constituency. 
Sources for the political variables: 
Beck, Murray, J. (1968).  Pendulum of Power. Scarborough: Prentice Hall of Canada, for data from 1870 through 
1944.  Thereafter, the web site of the Parliament of Canada based on the reports of the Chief Electoral Officer of 
Canada: www.parl.gc.ca  
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